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Abstract
The theory of Mean Field Games (MFG) allows characterizing the Nash equilibria of an infinite number
of identical players, and provides a convenient and relevant mathematical framework for the study of games
with a large number of agents in interaction. Until very recently, the literature only considered Nash
equilibria between fully informed players. In this paper, we focus on the realistic setting where agents with
no prior information on the game learn their best response policy through repeated experience. We study
the convergence to a (possibly approximate) Nash equilibrium of a fictitious play iterative learning scheme
where the best response is approximately computed, typically by a reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm.
Notably, we show for the first time convergence of model free learning algorithms towards non-stationary
MFG equilibria, relying only on classical assumptions on the MFG dynamics. We illustrate our theoretical
results with a numerical experiment in continuous action-space setting, where the best response of the
iterative fictitious play scheme is computed with a deep RL algorithm.
1 Introduction
We consider the computation of Nash equilibria for systems with a large number of anonymous identical
agents in interaction. Such systems encompass the modeling of numerous applications such as traffic jam
dynamics, swarm systems, financial market equilibrium, crowd evacuation, smart grid control, web advertising
auction, vaccination dynamics, rumor spreading on social media, among others. As each agent is small
in comparison to the population size, its own effect on the global system can be neglected. Consequently,
the asymptotic limit with infinite population size is highly relevant and corresponds to considering Mean
Field Games (MFG), introduced by Lasry and Lions [2006a,b, 2007] and by Huang et al. [2006, 2007]. In
a sequential game theory setting, each player needs to take into account its impact on the other players
strategy. Studying games with an infinite number of players is easier from this point of view, as the impact
of one single player on the others can be neglected. Furthermore, the optimal policy for the asymptotic MFG
often provides an approximate Nash equilibrium for the game with a finite number of players [Cardaliaguet,
2013; Bensoussan et al., 2013; Carmona and Delarue, 2018b].
∗This research was conducted while Romuald Elie was a visiting researcher at Google Brain.
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A solution to a dynamic MFG is determined via the optimal policy of a representative agent in response to
the flow of the entire population. A mean field Nash equilibrium arises when the distribution of the best
response policies over the population generates the exact same population flow. In the rapidly growing
literature on MFG, most papers consider fully informed agents about the game operation scheme and the
MF population dynamics. Only a few works consider the realistic case where the agents are learning the
game dynamics and rewards as they play, e.g. [Yin et al., 2010; Cardaliaguet and Lehalle, 2018; Hadikhanloo,
2018]. In this paper, we focus on a realistic setting where agents with no prior information learn sequentially
as they play.
Similarly, in a Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) setting, all agents are learning simultaneously
how to act optimally in a dynamic system. In comparison to the single-agent case, the derivation of efficient
learning algorithms in such context is difficult due to the lack of stationarity of the environment, whose
dynamics evolves as the population learns [Bu et al., 2008]. Our approach investigates how any single-agent
RL algorithm can be applied in a MFG setting, in order to learn a (possibly approximate) Nash equilibrium,
via repeated experiences and without any prior knowledge.
For this purpose, our approach relies on a Fictitious Play (FP) iterative learning scheme for repeated
games, where each agent calibrates its belief to the empirical frequency of the previously observed population
flows. Whenever each agent is able to compute its exact best response to a population flow, FP is proved
to reach asymptotically a Nash equilibrium in some (but not all [Shapley, 1964]) classes of games, such as
first order monotone MFG [Hadikhanloo, 2018]. We focus here on a realistic setting, where the exact best
response remains unattainable and is typically approximated via a single-agent RL algorithm. This induces
an approximation error at each iteration, which propagates through the FP learning scheme.
The main contribution of this paper is the rigorous study of the error propagation in Approximate
FP algorithms for MFGs, using an innovative line of proof in comparison to the standard two time scale
approximation convergence results [Leslie and Collins, 2006; Borkar, 1997]. This allows discussing the
convergence to a (possibly approximate) MF Nash equilibrium, when using any standard off-the-shelf single-
agent RL algorithm. Especially, our theoretical framework encompasses the convergence of RL algorithms
to MFG equilibrium in non stationary settings, which, as far as we know, is new in the literature. The
convergence properties are obtained for 1st order monotone MFGs [Gomes et al., 2010] and rely on reasonable
and verifiable assumptions on the MFG dynamics. We illustrate our theoretical results with a numerical
experiment in a newly addressed continuous state-action environment, where the approximate best response
of the iterative FP scheme is computed with a deep RL algorithm.
2 Background
Mean Field Games. MFGs were introduced by Lasry and Lions [2006a,b, 2007] and by Huang et al.
[2006, 2007]. An MFG corresponds to the asymptotic limit of a differential game, when the number of agents
is infinite. Due to game interactions, the state dynamics and the reward of each agent depend on the states
of the other ones, as in crowd motion. Since all agents are assumed to be identical and indistinguishable,
individual interactions are irrelevant in the limit and only the distribution of states matters (see [Cardaliaguet,
2013; Bensoussan et al., 2013; Carmona and Delarue, 2018a] for an introduction). In order to emphasize
the proximity of MFG with regard to the RL literature, we choose to present our analysis in a discrete time
setting.
Finding a Mean Field Nash equilibrium boils down to identifying the equilibrium distribution dynamics of
the population and the best response (or optimal policy) of a representative agent to this population mean
field flow. Since the number of players is infinite, each agent has an infinitesimal influence on the population
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distribution. Yet, since all agents are rational, the state distribution generated by the optimal policy must
coincide at equilibrium with the population distribution.
Notations. Let X and A be compact convex subsets of R` and Rd respectively, which represent the state
and action spaces common to every agent. Let T > 0 be a time horizon and let T denote the time sequence
{0, 1, . . . , T}. We denote by P(X ) the set of probability measures on X and by MT = P(X )T the set of all
possible flows of population state distributions µ = (µ0, µ1, ..., µT ). The initial distribution of the population
is an atomless measure on X denoted by µ0. For µ ∈ MT , µt represents the distribution at time t of the
state occupation of the entire population.
State dynamics & Mean field population flow. At any time t ∈ T, each agent belongs to a state
xt ∈ X and picks an action at ∈ A. For a sequence of actions a := (at)t∈T, the dynamics of x is governed by
a Markov Decision Process (MDP) with transition density pt(.|xt, at, µt) parametrized by the mean field flow
µ ∈MT of the population. This indexation transcribes the interactions with the other agents, through their
state distribution µt. Typically, the dynamics of x is described by an equation of the form
xt+1 = xt + b(xt, at, µt) + t+1, (1)
where b : X ×A× P(X )→ X is a drift function and (t)t≥1 is a source of noise. We stress that the mean
field term µt, is the whole population distribution and not just the average state.
We denote by ΠT the set of policies (or controls) pi : T×X → A which are feedback in the state: at time t,
an agent using policy pi while in state xt plays the action at = pi(t, xt). The process x controlled by pi ∈ ΠT
is denoted xpi.
Agent’s reward scheme. An infinitesimal agent starting at time 0 in state x0 ∈ X chooses a policy
pi ∈ ΠT in order to maximize the following discounted expected sum of rewards:
J(x0, pi, µ) := E
[
T−1∑
t=0
γtr(xpit , µt, at)
]
, (2)
while interacting with the population MF flow µ ∈MT . At time t, the agent’s rewards are impacted by µt,
which represents the aggregate state distribution of all the other agents (i.e. of the whole population). Since
the agents are anonymous, only the MF distribution flow µ of the states matters.
As µ0 denotes the state distribution at time 0, the average reward for a typical agent is given by
J(pi, µ) := Ex0∼µ0 [J(x0, pi, µ)] , (3)
when this agent uses policy pi ∈ ΠT , while the mean field population flow is µ.
Definition 1 (Best response). A policy pi∗ maximizing J(., µ) is called a best response of the representative
agent to the MF population dynamic flow µ.
MF Nash Equilibrium. While interacting, the agents may or may not reach a Nash equilibrium, whose
definition, based on the previous best response policy characterization, is:
Definition 2 (Mean Field Nash equilibrium). A pair (pi∗, µ∗) consisting of a policy and a MF population
distribution flow is called MF Nash equilibrium if it satisfies
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→ agent rationality: pi∗ is a best response to µ∗;
→ population consistency: for all t ∈ T, µ∗t is the distribution of x∗t , starting with distribution µ0
and controlled by pi∗.
Namely, if the mean field population flow is µ∗, the policy pi∗ is optimal, and if all the agents play according
to pi∗, the induced mean field population flow coincides with µ∗. Hereby, (pi∗, µ∗) identifies to an MF Nash
equilibrium.
Observe that reaching an MF Nash equilibrium requires the computation of exact best response policy,
which can be difficult in practice. We are concerned with the design of an iterative learning scheme, where the
available best response is partially accurate and typically approximated by RL through repeated experiences.
E.g., this realistic situation arises when agents are repeatedly optimizing their daily driving trajectories,
without any prior information on the traffic jam flow dynamic rules.
3 Fictitious Play Algorithms for MFG
Fictitious play [Robinson, 1951] is an iterative learning scheme for repeated games, where each agent calibrates
its belief to the empirical frequency of previously observed strategies of other agents, and plays optimally
according to its beliefs. This constitutes its best response. Even in simple two-player games, the convergence
of FP to a Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed [Shapley, 1964]. However, the convergence of FP has recently
been proved for some classes of Mean Field Games [Hadikhanloo, 2018, 2017; Cardaliaguet and Hadikhanloo,
2017].
Yet, in most cases, agents do not have access to the exact best response policy pi∗ but use an approximate
version of it instead, in the spirit of [Leslie and Collins, 2006; Pérolat et al., 2018]. At each iteration step n,
the agent has only access to an approximate version pˆin+1 of the best response pi∗,n+1 to the mean field flow
µ¯(n), as presented in Algorithm 1. For sake of clarity, we also report the exact FP algorithm in the Appendix.
So at each iteration step n, the learning scheme induces an additional error `n defined as
`n := Ex0∼µ0 [J(x0, pi∗,(n+1), µ¯(n))− J(x0, pˆi(n+1), µ¯(n))] ≥ 0 , n ∈ N .
Observe that `n identifies to the expected loss over the entire population at step n, when using the approximate
policy pˆi(n+1) instead of the exact one pi∗,(n+1). In Sec 4 below, we quantify the error propagation of `n and
clarify the convergence properties of Algorithm 1. The specific setting where the approximate optimal policy
is computed using single-agent RL algorithms is discussed in Sec 4.3.
Approximate Nash equilibrium At each step n, we denote by p¯i(n) the agent belief on the aggregate
population policy, defined as an equally randomized version of all previous approximate best responses
(pˆi(k))k=1,...,n: for each t ∈ T and x ∈ X , p¯i(n)(t, x) ∈ P(A) is the probability distribution on the set of actions
A according to which the player picks uniformly at random an element of {pˆi(1)(t, x), . . . , pˆi(n)(t, x)}. With a
slight abuse of notation, we write
J(x0, p¯i
(n), µ¯(n)) :=
1
n
n∑
k=1
J(x0, pˆi
(k), µ¯(n)) , n ∈ N .
By construction, µ¯(n) identifies to the population MF flow induced by the policy p¯i(n). In order to assess the
quality of (µ¯(n), p¯i(n)) as an (approximate) MF Nash equilibrium, we introduce
en := Ex0∼µ0 [J(x0, pi∗,(n+1), µ¯(n))− J(x0, p¯i(n), µ¯(n))] ≥ 0 , n ∈ N .
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Algorithm 1: Approximate Fictitious Play for MFG
Data: An initial distribution µ0; an initial flow of distributions µ¯(0); a number of steps N .
Result: A flow of distribution µ and a policy pi.
1 begin
2 for n = 0, 1, . . . N − 1 do
3 Compute pˆi(n+1), the approximate response policy against µ¯(n). Compute µˆ(n+1), the mean field
flow associated to pˆi(n+1) starting with µˆ(n+1)0 = µ0
4 Update µ¯(n+1) = nn+1 µ¯
(n) + 1n+1 µˆ
(n+1)
5 return (µ¯(N), pˆi(N))
The error en quantifies at iteration n the expected gain for a typical agent, when shifting its belief p¯i(n) to
the exact best response pi∗,(n+1), while interacting with the MF population flow µ¯(n). After n iterations in
Algorithm 1, en measures the quality of (µ¯(n), p¯i(n)) as a MF Nash equilibrium. For the sake of clarification,
let us introduce a weaker notion of MF Nash equilibrium, borrowed from [Carmona, 2004].
Definition 3 (Approximate MF Nash equilibrium). For  > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), a pair (pi∗,δ, µ∗,δ) consisting of
a policy and a population distribution flow is called an (, δ)−MF Nash equilibrium if
µ0
({
x0 ∈ supp(µ0) ; J(x0, pi∗,δ, µ∗,δ) ≥ J(x0, pi′, µ∗,δ)− ,∀pi′ ∈ ΠT
}) ≥ 1− δ,
and µ∗,δ coincides with the MF distribution flow starting from µ0, when every agent uses policy pi
∗
,δ.
An (, δ)−MF Nash equilibrium is interpreted as a weak equilibrium which is -optimal for at least a
fraction (1− δ) of the population. We are now able to clarify how en characterizes the quality of (µ¯(n), p¯i(n))
as an MF Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 4. If 0 ≤ en ≤ 2, then (µ¯(n), p¯i(n)) is an (, )-MF Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, if en goes to 0
as n goes to infinity, µ¯(n) converges to an MF Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Assume 0 ≤ en ≤ 2. Let us introduce ϕ(x0) := J(x0, pi∗,(n+1), µ¯(n)) − J(x0, p¯i(n), µ¯(n)), which is
non-negative since pi∗,(n+1) is the best response to the MF flow µ¯(n).
Using Markov’s inequality and the bound on en we obtain
µ0 ({x0 ∈ X : ϕ(x0) ≥ }) = Px0∼µ0 [ϕ(x0) ≥ ] ≤
Ex0∼µ0 [ϕ(x0)]

=
en

≤ 
2

= .
Collecting the terms and using the definition of ϕ, we deduce
µ0
({
x0 ∈ X : J(x0, pi∗,(n+1), µ¯(n)) ≤ J(x0, p¯i(n), µ¯(n)) + 
})
≥ 1−  ,
so that (p¯i(n), µ¯(n)) is an (, )-MF Nash equilibrium.
The second part of the theorem is a direct consequence of the first one.
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4 Error propagation & Nash equilibrium approximation for 1st or-
der MFG
Since (en)n identifies to a relevant quality measure of Algorithm 1 after n iterations, we now evaluate how
the individual learning errors (`k)0≤k≤n aggregate over en. For the sake of simplicity, we focus our discussion
on 1st order mean field games, i.e. without source of noise in the dynamics. This allows us to build our
reasoning on the analysis of Hadikhanloo [2017] and to avoid a restriction to potential games. Nevertheless,
since Fictitious Play has also been studied for potential second order MFGs [Cardaliaguet and Hadikhanloo,
2017], we think that similar results should hold in that setting as well.
4.1 First order mean field game
The state (xt)t evolves in Rd with dynamics (1), where we take b(x, a, µ) = a, and (t)t = 0. In other words,
each agent controls exactly its state variation between two time steps and does not endure any noise. While
interacting with a MF flow µ ∈MT , each agent intends to maximize the classical reward scheme given by (2)
with a running reward at time t of the form:
r(xpit , µt, at) 7→ r˜(xpit , at) + r¯(xpit , µt), (4)
where the extra r¯ captures the impact of the other agents’ positions. In Sec. 5, we provide in particular
an example where r¯ models an appeal for non-crowded regions. This type of conditions translates into the
so-called Lasry-Lions monotonicity condition [Lasry and Lions, 2007] which ensures uniqueness of MF Nash
equilibrium. More precisely, existence and uniqueness of solution to the 1st order MFG of interest holds
under the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. For some constant C, the reward functions r˜ and r¯ satisfy:
• For every x ∈ X , the map r˜(x, .) is twice differentiable and 1C Id ≤ Daar˜(x, .) ≤ CId ,
• The function r¯ is continuous on : X × P(X ) and r¯(.,m) is C1 on X ,
• ‖r˜(., .)‖∞ + ‖r¯(., .)‖∞ ≤ C ,
• The Lasry-Lions monotonicity condition holds:∫
X
[r¯(.,m1)− r¯(.,m2)] d[m1 −m2] < 0 , for all m1,m2 ∈ P(X ) . (5)
4.2 Error propagation in the Fictitious Play algorithm
We first investigate how the learning error (`n)n propagates through FP in general, while Sec 4.3 focuses on
the specific case where the best response is approximated via RL.
The main feature of FP is the quick stabilization of the sequence of beliefs (µ¯(n))n.
Lemma 5. Under Assumption 1, the fictitious play MF flow µ¯(n) satisfies:
d1(µ¯
(n), µ¯(n+1)) ≤ C
n
, n ∈ N, for some constant C > 0 ,
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where d1 is the Wasserstein distance. The proof follows from a straightforward adaptation of the arguments
used in [Hadikhanloo, 2018, Lemma 3.3.2] to our setting. It is provided in the Appendix for sake of
completeness, together with the definition of the Wasserstein distance d1.
As the sequence of beliefs µ¯n stabilizes, the impact of recent learning errors (`n) reduces and we are in
position to quantify the global error en of the algorithm after n iteration steps. This is the main result of the
paper, whose line of proof reported in the Appendix interestingly differs from the more classical two-time
scale approximation argumentation [Borkar, 1997].
Theorem 6. Under Assumption 1, the Nash equilibrium quality (en)n satisfies both estimates:
0 ≤ en ≤ C1
n
+
C1
n
n∑
i=1
d1(µ
∗,(i+1), µˆ(i+1)) +
1
n
n∑
i=1
`i, n ∈ N, (6)
0 ≤ en ≤ `n + C2
n
+
C2
n
n∑
i=1
d1(µˆ
(i+1), µˆ(i+2)) +
n∑
i=1
i+ 1
n
`i, n ∈ N , (7)
for some constants C1 and C2.
Bound (6) indicates a nice averaging aggregation of the learning errors (`n)n, but requires a strong
additional control on the Wasserstein distance between the MF flows generated by both approximate and
exact best responses. Such estimate is readily available for the numerical approximation of convex stochastic
control problems [Kushner and Dupuis, 2013] but less classical in the RL literature, as discussed in Sec 4.3.
When such an estimate is not available, Bound (7) provides a slower n`n convergence rate, up to a weak
d1-regularity of the approximate best response in terms of the mean field flow µ¯(n), recall Lemma 5. Such a
weak estimate is for example highly classical in the setting of convex stochastic control problems with Lipschitz
rewards [Fleming and Rishel, 2012; Kushner and Dupuis, 2013]. At finite distance and asymptotically, the
following corollary sums up these properties in terms of MF Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 7. If `n + C1d1(µ∗,(n), µˆ(n))) or n`n + C2d1(µˆ(n+1), µˆ(n))) is bounded by 2/2, (µ¯n, p¯in)n is an
(, )-MF Nash equilibrium, for n large enough.
In a similar fashion, we can conclude on the general asymptotic convergence of Algorithm 1 to the unique
MF-Nash equilibrium, before discussing the specific implications for RL best response approximation schemes.
Corollary 8. The approximate FP algorithm converges to the unique MF Nash equilibrium whenever one of
the following two conditions holds:
1. The approximate best response update procedure µ¯(n) 7→ µˆ(n+1) is continuous in d1,
and n`n converges to 0, as n goes to ∞ ;
2. The learning and policy approximation errors `n and (d1(µ∗,(n), µˆ(n)))n converge to 0.
4.3 Discussion on the convergence for Best Response RL approximation
The result in Theorem 6 is general and relies on standard assumptions of MFGs. It also relies on a good
enough control of the approximation error of the best response at each iteration. Here, we discuss to what
extent existing theoretical results for RL algorithms allow satisfying this assumption.
As stated in Corollary 8, in order for the approximate FP to converge to the exact MF Nash equilibrium,
the approximate best response should converge quickly enough to the best one, depending on the number
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of iterations. From an RL perspective, this would require being able to compute the approximate optimal
policy to an arbitrary precision, with high probability. As far as we know, such a result is possible only when
an exact representation of any value function is possible, that is, in the tabular setting which imposes finite
state and action spaces. Notably, convergence and rate of convergence of Q-learning-like algorithms have
been studied in the literature, see e.g. [Szepesvári, 1998; Kearns and Singh, 1999; Even-Dar and Mansour,
2003; Azar et al., 2011]. For example, the speedy Q-learning algorithm requires O(ln(K)/(2(1− γ)4)) steps
to learn an -optimal state-action value function with high probability, with K the number of state-action
couples. According to Corollary 8, if the error is in O(n−α) with α > 1 (and if we have continuity in d1),
then the scheme converges to the Nash equilibrium. This suggests using O(ln(K)n2α/(1− γ)4) steps for the
RL agent at iteration n. Yet, this kind of results does not provide guarantees on the continuity in d1.
According to Corollary 7, bounding the learning errors and the distance between two iterates of the
distribution is sufficient to reach an approximate Nash equilibrium. As approximate FP can be seen as
repeated RL problems, RL (or approximate dynamic programming) can be seen as repeated supervised learning
problems, and the propagation of errors from supervised to RL is a well studied field, see e.g. [Farahmand
et al., 2010; Scherrer et al., 2015]. Basically, if the supervised learning steps are bounded by some O(), then
the learning error of the RL algorithm is bounded by O(C/(1− γ)2), where C is a so -called concentrability
coefficient, measuring the mismatch between some measures. In principle, we could then propagate the
learning error of the supervised learning part up to the FP error, through the RL error. However, these
results do not provide any guarantees on the proximity between the estimated optimal policy and the actual
one (which would be a sufficient condition for the proximity between population distributions); it only
provides a guarantee on the distance between their respective returns. This is due to the fact that in RL, the
optimal value function is unique, but not the optimal policy. A perspective would be to consider regularized
MDPs [Geist et al., 2019], where the optimal policy is unique (and greediness is Lipschitz). Yet, this would
come at the cost of a bias in the Nash equilibria. The approach in [Guo et al., 2019] somehow builds partially
on this idea.
5 Numerical illustration
As an illustration, we consider a stylized MFG model with congestion in the spirit of Almulla et al. [2017].
This application should be seen as a proof of concept showing that the method described above can be
applied beyond the framework used for our theoretical results. We compute a model free approximation of
the MFG solution combining Algorithm 1 with Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (DDPG) [Lillicrap et al.,
2016]. As far as we know, this is the first numerical illustration of model free deep RL Algorithm for Mean
Field Games with continuous states and actions.
Environment Each agent has a position x located on the torus T = [0, 1] with periodic boundary conditions,
whose dynamics is governed by xt+1 = xt + at∆t +
√
∆tt, t = 0, 1, . . . , where ∆t is the time step of the
continuous time process. It receives the per-step reward
r(xt, µt, at) = r˜(xt)− 1
2
|at|2 − log(µt) ,
where the last term motivates agents to avoid congestion, i.e. the proximity to a region with a large population
density. In the continuous time setting with no discounting, a direct PDE argument provides the ergodic
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Figure 1: First row from left to right: 1) the continuous time explicit solution for γ = 1, 2) the discrete
time learned distribution of the policy with γ = 0.95 and ∆t = 0.05 and 3) the L2 error between the explicit
solution and the density for each fictitious play iterations. Second row from left to right: 1) the optimal
control 2) the learned control at iteration 125, and 3) the L2 error between the control and the optimal
control and for each fictitious play iterations on a trajectory.
solution (a∗, µ∗) in closed form [Almulla et al., 2017]
a∗ : x 7→ pi cos(2pix) and µ∗ : x 7→ e
2 sin(2pix)∫
T
e2 sin(2piy)dy
, (8)
when the geographic reward is of the form r˜(xt) = 2pi2 sin(2pixt)− 2pi2 cos(2pixt)2 + 2 sin(2pixt). This closed
form solution offers a nice benchmark for our experiments.
Implemented Algorithm Model free FP for MFGs takes a somehow similar approach as Lanctot et al.
[2017] in the sense that we estimate the best response using a model free RL algorithm (namely DDPG).
However we do not maintain those best responses as in [Lanctot et al., 2017] but rather learn the population
MF flow of the distribution of the representative agents. The implemented algorithm and the subroutines
used are described in the Appendix. The best response approximation through DDPG and the estimation of
the population MF are left in the Algorithm. We ran 30000 trajectories of DDPG with a trajectory length of
300. The noise used for the for exploration is a normal noise centered around 0 and of variance 0.02 and we
used Adam optimizers with a starting learning rate of 0.001 and τ = 0.01. At each iteration of FP, we added
3000 trajectories of length 1000 to the replay buffer. Finally, we estimated the density using 100 classes and
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doing 30000 steps of Adam (with an initial learning rate of 0.001).
Algorithm 2: Fictitious Play for continuous state and action Mean Field Games
Data: Number of FP iterations NFP, an empty buffer of trajectories R and a number of trajectories to
collect,
Result: a density µ¯(NFP) and a strategy pˆi(NFP).
1 begin
2 for n = 1, . . . , NFP do
3 Initialize replay buffer R, for t = 0, 1, . . . T − 1 do
4 Compute a best response pˆi(n) using DDPG,
5 Collect trajectories of the strategy pˆi(n) and add them to the buffer R,
6 Learn the population mean field flow µ¯(n) by Monte Carlo samples on R
7 return µ¯(NFP) and pˆi(NFP)
Results. Figure 1 presents the learned equilibrium computed for γ = 0.95, N = 90 and uniform initial
distribution, as well as the continuous time closed form ergodic solution for γ = 1, see (8). We emphasize that
the variation in γ together with the discrete/continuous time difference setting implies that the theoretical
solutions to both problems are close but do not exactly coincide. We keep this benchmark since no ergodic
closed form solution is available for γ 6= 1. As observed on Figure 1, both ergodic explicit and learned
distributions and controls are close. As expected, the density of players is larger around the point of maximum
of the reward but the distribution is not highly concentrated due to the logarithmic penalty encoding aversion
for congested regions. More precisely, Figure 1 indicates that the L2 errors between the distributions and the
controls decrease with the number n of iterations. The convergence of control distributions echoes to the
discussion on error propagation in Section 4.2. This example clearly illustrates the numerical convergence of
the Deep RL fictitious play mean field algorithm.
6 Conclusion, related work and future research
We presented a rigorous convergence analysis of model free FP learning algorithm for the resolution of
MFG, in particular when the best response is approximated using single agent RL algorithms. Our setting
encompasses for the first time the consideration of non-stationary MFG and relies on reasonable verifiable
assumptions on the MFG. The convergence is illustrated for the first time by numerical experiments in a
continuous (state,action) setting, based on deep RL algorithm.
The related literature is as follows. Recently, Guo et al. [2019] and Subramanian and Mahajan [2019]
respectively introduced Q-learning and policy gradient model free RL algorithms for solving MFGs. However,
their studies restrict to a stationary setting and their convergence results hold under assumptions that are
hard to verify in practice. Yang et al. [2018] focused on a MF interaction through the empirical action average.
Numerical illustrations provided in these papers are in a finite state-action setting. As for model-based
learning algorithms, Yin et al. [2010] studied a MF oscillator game while Hu [2019] proposed a decentralized
deep FP learning architecture for large MARL, whose convergence holds on linear quadratic MFG examples
with explicit solution and small maturity.
We showed how the convergence of model free iterative FP algorithm reduces to the error analysis of each
RL iteration step, as the convergence of RL algorithm reduces to the aggregation of repeated supervised
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learning approximation errors. This allows to study the convergence of MARL algorithms using single RL
approximation properties in this context. Besides, our analysis suggests a must faster convergence rate,
whenever the best response approximation quality can be controlled in Wasserstein distance. This kind of
estimate is currently not available in RL convergence literature, although highly classical in the literature of
numerical approximation of stochastic control problems. This observation enlights relevant directions for
future research.
11
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Appendix
This Appendix regroups the technical proofs related to the error propagation bounds on the Approximate
Fictitious Play algorithm detailed in Theorem 6. Many arguments reported here are inspired by the results
presented in [Hadikhanloo, 2018] for the exact fictitious play algorithm.
We follow the notations of Section 4. In particular, we recall that X denotes the set of accessible states
before time T . Since we take b(x, a, µ) = a and the set A is compact, X T = X × · · · × X is compact too and
in particular it is a bounded subset of RT×d.
In order to measure the proximity between MF population flows, we denote by d1, the 1− Wasserstein
distance defined (using Kantorovitch-Rubinstein duality) as:
d1(µ, µ
′) = sup
f∈Lip1(XT ,R)
∑
t∈T
∫
X
h(x)d(µt − µ′t)(x), for all µ, µ′ ∈MT ,
where Lip1(X T ,R) is the set of 1-Lipschitz continuous function from X T to R.
A. Stability of the FP mean field flow (µ¯(n))n
Let us first provide the proof of Lemma 5 which ensures the closedness in d1 of two consecutive elements of
the Mean field flow learning sequence µ¯(n). Let first recall from the definition of µ¯(n) that we have:
µ¯(n+1) − µ¯(n) = 1
n
[
µˆ(n+1) − µ¯(n+1)
]
=
1
n+ 1
[
µˆ(n+1) − µ¯(n)
]
, n ∈ N . (9)
Proof of Lemma 5. Let h ∈ Lip1(X T ,R). We recall that X T is bounded and pick x0 ∈ X T . Then, using (9)
together with the definition of µ¯(n), we compute∣∣∣∣∫XT h(x)d(µ¯(n+1) − µ¯(n))(x)
∣∣∣∣ = 1n+ 1
∣∣∣∣∫XT h(x)d(µˆ(n) − µ¯(n))(x)
∣∣∣∣
=
1
n+ 1
∣∣∣∣∫XT (h(x)− h(x0))d(µˆ(n) − µ¯(n))(x)
∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
n+ 1
(∫
XT
‖x− x0‖dµˆ(n)(x) +
∫
XT
‖x− x0‖dµˆ(n)(x)
)
≤ C
n+ 1
,
since X T is bounded. This result being valid for any h ∈ Lip1(X T ,R), we obtain
d1(µ¯
(n+1), µ¯(n)) ≤ C
n+ 1
, n ∈ N .
B. Propagation error estimates
This section is dedicated to the rigorous derivation of the bounds (7) and (6) presented in Theorem 4.
We first recall the following useful result, see e.g. [Hadikhanloo, 2018, Lemma 3.3.1].
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Lemma 9. Let (ϕn)n and (λn)n be two sequences of real numbers such that
(n+ 1)ϕn+1 − nϕn ≤ λn, n ∈ N .
Then, we have the estimate:
ϕn ≤ ϕ0
n
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
λi, n ∈ N .
For ease of notation, we introduce Jn := J(., µ¯(n)) and Jn+1 := J(., µ¯(n+1)) (which are functions defined
over X T ), for all n ≥ 0. More precisely, for x ∈ X T ,
Jn(x) := J(x0, (xt+1 − xt)t=0,...,T−1, µ¯(n)).
Observe that this definition is accurate by the definition of the first order MFG setting presented in Section
4.1 and because there is a bijection between process trajectory and the combination of initial position and
policy.
Proof of estimate (7) in Theorem 6. We adapt the arguments in the proof of [Hadikhanloo, 2018, Theorem
3.3.1] to our setting with approximate best responses.
Let introduce the approximate learning error eˆn defined by
eˆn := Ex0∼µ0 [J(x0, pˆi(n+1), µ¯(n))− J(x0, p¯i(n), µ¯(n))] ≥ 0 , n ∈ N ,
so that en = `n + eˆn. In order to control en, we will focus our analysis on eˆn and compute
(n+ 1)eˆn+1 − neˆn
= (n+ 1)
∫
XT
Jn+1d(µˆ
(n+2) − µ¯(n+1))− n
∫
XT
Jnd(µˆ
(n+1) − µ¯(n))
= (n+ 1)
∫
XT
Jn+1d(µˆ
(n+1) − µ¯(n+1))− n
∫
XT
Jnd(µˆ
(n+1) − µ¯(n))
+ (n+ 1)
∫
XT
Jn+1d(µˆ
(n+2) − µˆ(n+1))
= n(n+ 1)
∫
XT
(Jn+1 − Jn)d(µ¯(n+1) − µ¯(n)) + (n+ 1)
∫
XT
Jn+1d(µˆ
(n+2) − µˆ(n+1)),
where the last equality follows from (9).
Thanks to Assumption 1, the monotonicity of the reward function implies directly
(n+ 1)eˆn+1 − neˆn ≤ (n+ 1)
∫
XT
Jn+1d(µˆ
(n+2) − µˆ(n+1)). (10)
By definition of Jn together with the first order MFG dynamics, we have the expression
Jn(x) =
T−1∑
t=0
γt
[
r˜(xt, xt+1 − xt) + r¯(xt, µ¯(n)t )
]
.
Moreover, using Assumption 1 and the compactness of X , we deduce as in [Hadikhanloo, 2018, Lemma 3.5.2],
the existence of a constant C such that for all x,x′ ∈ X T ,
|Jn+1(x)− Jn(x)− Jn+1(x′) + Jn(x′)| ≤ C‖x− x′‖∞ d1(µ¯(n+1), µ¯(n)). (11)
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This property of the reward function together with Lemma 5 indicate that Jn+1 − Jn is C/n-Lipschitz, so
that
(n+ 1)eˆn+1 − neˆn ≤ (n+ 1)
∫
XT
Jnd(µˆ
(n+2) − µˆ(n+1)) + Cd1(µˆ(n+2), µˆ(n+1))
≤ (n+ 1)
∫
XT
Jnd(µ
∗,(n+1) − µˆ(n+1)) + Cd1(µˆ(n+2), µˆ(n+1)) ,
where, in the last inequality, we used the fact that pi∗,(n+1) is the best response with respect to µ¯(n) and
hence ∫
XT
Jndµ
∗,(n+1) ≥
∫
XT
Jndµˆ
(n+2). (12)
Indeed, by optimality of pi∗,(n+1), we have∫
XT
Jndµ
∗,(n+1) = J(pi∗,(n+1), µ¯(n)) ≥ J(pˆi(n+2), µ¯(n)).
By definition of the learning error `n in (3), we deduce
(n+ 1)eˆn+1 − neˆn ≤ (n+ 1)`n + Cd1(µˆ(n+2), µˆ(n+1)).
By Lemma 9 applied to
ϕn = eˆn, and λn = (n+ 1)`n + Cd1(µˆ(n+2), µˆ(n+1)),
we derive the estimate
eˆn ≤ `n + eˆ0
n
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
(i+ 1)`i +
1
n
n∑
i=1
d1(µˆ
(i+2), µˆ(i+1)).
Combining this estimate with the relation en = `n + eˆn provides (7).
We are now in position to turn to the proof of the remaining estimate (6).
Proof of estimate (6) in Theorem 6. Combining the relation en = `n + eˆn together with estimate (10), we
compute
(n+ 1)en+1 − nen
≤ (n+ 1)
∫
XT
Jn+1d(µ
∗,(n+2) − µˆ(n+1))− n
∫
XT
Jnd(µ
∗,(n+1) − µˆ(n+1))
= (n+ 1)
∫
XT
Jn+1d(µ
∗,(n+2) − µ∗,(n+1)) +
∫
XT
[(n+ 1)Jn+1 − nJn]d(µ∗,(n+1) − µˆ(n+1))
= (n+ 1)
∫
XT
[Jn+1 − Jn]d(µ∗,(n+2) − µ∗,(n+1)) + (n+ 1)
∫
XT
Jnd(µ
∗,(n+2) − µ∗,(n+1))
+(n+ 1)
∫
XT
[Jn+1 − Jn]d(µ∗,(n+1) − µˆ(n+1)) +
∫
XT
Jnd[µ
∗,(n+1) − µˆ(n+1)] .
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Hence, the Lipschitz property (11) together with Lemma 5 implies
(n+ 1)en+1 − nen ≤ Cd1(µ∗,(n+2), µ∗,(n+1)) + Cd1(µ∗,(n+1), µˆ(n+1)) + `n ,
where we also used that µ∗,(n+1) is the mean field flow induced by the best response to the population
distribution µ¯(n) so that ∫
XT
Jndµ
∗,(n+1) ≥
∫
XT
Jndµˆ
(n+2).
Finally, Lemma 5 together with the continuity of the best response in the first order MFG (which stems
from Assumption 1, see e.g. [Hadikhanloo, 2018, Remark 3.5.3]) ensure that d1(µ∗,(n+2), µ∗,(n+1)) converges
to zero as n goes to infinity. Finally, applying Lemma 9 to
ϕn = en, and λn = `n + Cd1(µ∗,(n+1), µˆ(n+1)) +
C
n
directly concludes the proof.
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C. Exact Mean Field Fictitious Play Algorithm
Algorithm 3: Exact Fictitious Play for MFG
Data: An initial distribution µ0; an initial mean field flow µ¯∗,(0); a number of steps N .
Result: A mean field flow µ and a policy pi.
1 begin
2 for n = 0, 1, . . . N − 1 do
3 Compute pi∗,(n+1), the best response policy against µ∗,(n) (see Definition 1)
4 Update µ¯∗,(n+1) = nn+1 µ¯
∗,(n) + 1n+1µ
∗,(n+1)
5 return (µ¯∗,(N), pi∗,(N))
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D. Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient
Algorithm 4: DDPG
Data: Randomly initialize critic network Q(x, a|θQ) and actor network pi(x|θpi) with weights θQ and θpi
and initialize target network Q′ and actor network pi′ with weights θQ
′ ← θQ and θpi′ ← θpi.
Result: a policy pi.
1 begin
2 for episode = 0, 1, . . .M − 1 do
3 Initialize replay buffer R, for t = 0, 1, . . . T − 1 do
4 Select an action at = pi(x|θpi) +Nt according to the current policy and exploration noise,
5 Execute action at and observe reward rt and new state xt+1,
6 Store transition (xt, at, rt, xt+1) in R
7 Sample a random minibatch of N transitions (xi, ai, ri, xi+1) from R
8 Set yi = ri + γQ′(xi+1, pi′(xi+1|θpi′))
9 Update critic by minimizing the loss: L = 1N
∑
i
(yi −Q(xi, ai|θQ))2,
10 Update the actor policy using the sampled policy gradient:
∇θpiJ ' 1N
∑
i
∇aQ(x, a|θQ)|x=xi,a=pi(xi)∇θpipi(x|θpi)|x=x1
11 Update target networks:
θQ
′ ← τθQ + (1− τ)θQ′
θpi
′ ← τθpi + (1− τ)θpi′
12 return pi
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Algorithm 5: Density Estimation
Data: State dataset X, a number of iterations N , a number of classes Nclasses and the parameters θ of
the function representing the density.
Result: a policy pi.
1 begin
2 for i = 0, 1, . . . N do
3 Sample a random minibatch of N states xi from R,
4 Construct the classes yi to which xi belong to,
5 minimize the loss L = 1N
∑
i
yi log(fθ)
6 return pi
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